Incomplete Markets, Labor Supply and Capital Accumulation by Marcet, Albert et al.
Incomplete Markets, Labor Supply
and Capital Accumulation∗
Albert Marcet Francesc Obiols-Homs Philippe Weil†
This version: October 2003
Abstract
We explore the accumulation of capital in the presence of limited
insurance against idiosyncratic shocks, borrowing constraints and en-
dogenous labor supply. In the exogenous labor supply case (e.g. Aiya-
gari 1994, Huggett 1997), the presence of limited insurance increases
the demand for savings for precautionary reasons. As a consequence,
capital and output are higher under incomplete markets. We show that
if labor hours are endogenous, labor supply is likely to be lower under
incomplete markets, because those agents who experience a high shock
to productivity are ex post richer and they work fewer hours. In some
cases, this wealth eﬀect can overcome the “aggregate precautionary
savings” and give rise to lower savings and output under incomplete
markets.
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1 Introduction
A fundamental result in the precautionary savings literature is that capital
market imperfections and the presence of uninsured idiosyncratic risk, leads
agents to save more than they would if there were no uncertainty.1 This
result holds in a wide variety of environments, including two-period and
infinite-horizon setups, partial and general equilibrium models, economies
with production, and when idiosyncratic shocks are i.i.d. or serially corre-
lated. The typical comparison is between the outcome when agents receive
random income draws from a given distribution, and the outcome when
agents receive with certainty the expected income (or endowment) of that
distribution. But this notion of precautionary saving extends to the com-
parison between economies with and without complete markets (i.e., com-
petitive insurance markets).2 In particular, Aiyagari (1994) and Huggett
(1997) studied dynamic economies with production and showed that capital
accumulation is larger under incomplete than under complete markets. We
label this eﬀect on capital accumulation the Aiyagari-Huggett eﬀect.
When hours worked are exogenous, an immediate implication of this eﬀect is
that output is larger under incomplete than under complete markets. This
conclusion seems to give rise to an “incomplete markets puzzle”, because
it is contrary to the informal intuition that a more eﬃcient allocation of
resources –possibly through better developed financial intermediation–
1See for instance Leland (1968) and Sandmo (1970), and more recently, Kimball (1990),
Deaton (1991), Carroll (1991), Huggett (1993) and Aiyagari (1994), among others.
2In this paper, “precautionary savings” refers to a larger accumulation of capital under
uncertainty than under certainty, rather than the notion associated to the convexity of
marginal utility. See Huggett and Ospina (2001) for a discussion.
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should not only increase welfare, but also savings, investment and output.
In fact, there is an extensive theoretical and empirical literature studying
the eﬀects of financial institutions on the performance of industries and on
growth rates. Just to cite an example, Levine uses data of a number of
countries and reports that “there is a strong positive relationship between
(...) financial indicators and (...) long run real per capita growth rates,
capital accumulation and productivity growth” (Levine, 1997 pag. 706).3
In this paper we explore the implications of introducing a leisure/labor deci-
sion in dynamic, general equilibrium models. In particular, we are interested
in the eﬀect of limited insurance against idiosyncratic risks on aggregate vari-
ables, such as capital and output, when labor supply is endogenous and the
idiosyncratic risk can make agents unproductive4.
Our main result is that, as long as leisure is a normal good, incomplete
insurance to idiosyncratic employment shocks introduces an ex post wealth
eﬀect which reduces labor supply. The intuition is that once uncertainty
is realized, employed agents under incomplete markets are richer than they
would be in a complete markets world (precisely because ex-ante they could
not and did not buy insurance against unemployment).5 Hence in a general
equilibrium model with production, ex post wealth eﬀects on labor supply
run counter to the Aiyagari-Huggett eﬀect, and which of these two eﬀects
3The causality between financial development and economic growth seems to be still
an unresolved question, as Levine (1997) himself emphasizes. Levine’s paper is a survey
of theories and empirical results about these issues with many references, thus we address
the interested reader to that paper. For a more recent treatment see Smith (2002).
4Barsky, Mankiw and Zeldes (1986, pg. 680), for instance, report that “... individual
incomes are highly vulnerable to disability, which includes medical, psychiatric, and other
factors limiting hours of work or precluding work entirely”.
5Baxter and Crucini (1995) describe a similar wealth eﬀect under incomplete markets.
They use it to explain the low consumption correlation across countries.
2
dominates depends on the precise parameters characterizing the economy.
To our knowledge very little is known about the eﬀects on saving and out-
put of limited insurance against idiosyncratic risks when labor supply is
endogenous.6 It seems interesting to consider endogenous labor for several
reasons. First, the time spent working is an important margin that house-
holds may use to adjust income fluctuations.7 Second, abstracting from
the labor/leisure decision precludes the analysis of wealth and substitution
eﬀects on labor supply. These eﬀects are key in understanding aggregate
consumption and saving (see for instance Benhabib, Rogerson and Wright
(1991) and the related quantitative literature about real business cycles).
Finally, the wealth eﬀect that we focus on has implications beyond the anal-
ysis of hours worked. Any input that is subject to uncertain productivity,
has a positive wealth elasticity and is complementary with capital is likely
to display similar eﬀects on output and savings; for example, if one were to
model explicitly technology adoption, entrepreneurship, human capital, etc.,
investment and output are likely to be smaller under incomplete markets for
the same reasons that they do in our paper.
We argue in four ways that the wealth eﬀect on labor supply lowers output
6At the theoretical level, see Flode´n (1998) in the tradition of the precautionary saving
literature. Related quantitative results for dynamic, general equilibrium models can be
found in R´ios-Rull (1994) and Low (2002) for life cycle economies, and in Krusell and
Smith (1998), Castan˜eda, D´iaz-Gime´nez and R´ios-Rull (2003), and Obiols-Homs (2003),
for models with infinitely lived agents. At the empirical level, the evidence regarding
precautionary saving is far from clear. See for instance Carroll, Dynan and Krane (1999)
and the references therein.
7There is substantial evidence of changes in the number of per capita hours worked in
the U.S. over the post Korean War period: changes in per capita hours worked explain
about 20% of the total variation in aggregate hours (see, for instance, Hansen (1985) and
Kydland (1995)). See Abowd and Card (1989) and the references therein for studies using
micro-data about the relationship between hours worked and earnings.
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under incomplete markets: i) we display the wealth eﬀect in a static envi-
ronment with uncertainty; ii) we show a multi-period general equilibrium
example where, if the parameters are chosen so that labor demand is high
and labor supply is low, output and savings are cut in half due to market
incompleteness; iii) we prove analytically that, contrary to what happens
when labor is exogenous, savings do not go to infinity when uncertainty is
stationary and β(1 + r) = 1; finally, iv) we report numerical simulations of
multi-period models with uncertainty in all periods.
Section 2 explores a partial equilibrium static model. Section 3 analyzes a
dynamic, multi-period, general equilibrium model with production, borrow-
ing constraints, idiosyncratic shocks and incomplete insurance.8 In addition
to results ii) and iii), it establishes that the interest rate in steady state
is smaller than the rate of time preference, so that the capital/labor ratio
is higher under incomplete markets. But if the ex post wealth eﬀect that
decreases labor supply is large enough, capital, output and savings might
be lower under incomplete markets. We thus investigate numerically which
eﬀect dominates for various parameter sets in Section 4. When the pa-
rameter set is calibrated to the US economy, we find that the wealth eﬀect
dominates, and that output goes down slightly under incomplete markets.
Section 5 concludes by outlining directions for further research. Appendix A
gathers the proofs, and Appendix B presents computational details as well
as some additional examples.
8Jappelli and Pagano (1994) study the implications for growth of market imperfections
in a deterministic model with overlapping generations. They find that a borrowing limit
promotes higher growth rates. In relation to this, Herna´ndez (1991) finds that a borrowing
limit has no eﬀects on steady states in his model without uncertainty and infinitely lived,
heterogeneous agents.
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2 Wealth eﬀects on labor supply in a static world
Does the unavailability of unemployment insurance lead people to work on
average more or less than when unemployment insurance is available? We
first study this question in the simplest possible environment: a static econ-
omy in which a fraction of the population might be randomly unemployed.
2.1 A simple model
The economy consists of a continuum of ex ante identical consumers over
the unit interval. Consumers have preferences U(c, l) over consumption and
leisure. The utility function U satisfies
A1: U : R+ × [0, 1]→ R+, is continuous and diﬀerentiable.
A2: U is strictly increasing and strictly concave in each of its arguments,
with limc→0Uc(c, l) = +∞ ∀l ∈ [0, 1], and liml→0 Ul(c, l) = +∞ ∀c ≥ 0
Labor supply is elastic with respect to wage (work eﬀort would otherwise be
the same under complete and incomplete markets). In addition, we require
that leisure be a normal good.
All consumers are endowed with one unit of time, but are subject to ex-
ogenous idiosyncratic employment shocks (or shocks of labor productivity,
like health shocks): when a consumer wakes up in the morning, she is either
employed or unemployed.9 We therefore model the employment state s as
a random variable that takes the value 0 with probability 1 − φ, and the
value 1 with probability φ. The employment probability φ is the same for all
agents, but the ex post realization of the employment process is individual-
9We assume that health cannot be influenced by the consumer’s actions. We thus
abstract for moral hazard considerations.
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specific. In the aggregate, given the continuum assumption, φ also measures
the fraction of the population that is employed.
Consumers receive a non-produced endowment Ω of the consumption good.
This endowment is non-random, and is identical across agents. Consumers
can supplement their endowment of the consumption good by devoting some
of their time to work: one unit of time produces 1 unit of the consumption
good in the employment state, and zero otherwise. Obviously, only employed
consumers will ever choose to sacrifice leisure to work.
2.2 Complete markets
Suppose that the consumers’ employment state can be perfectly and cost-
lessly monitored by third parties. In that setup, competitive insurance com-
panies can oﬀer unemployment insurance to the consumers at the actuarially
fair price p = 1− φ. By paying p units of the consumption good to the un-
employment insurance company before the shock is realized, consumers buy
the right to get 1 unit of the consumption good if they end up unemployed
at the end of the period, they get 0 otherwise. Letting Q denote the de-
mand for insurance, a consumer with non-produced endowment Ω solves the
following program:
max
ce,cu,l,Q
φU(ce, l) + (1− φ)U(cu, 1)
subject to: ce + pQ = Ω+ (1− l), cu + pQ = Ω+Q,
ce, cu,Q ≥ 0, 0 ≤ l ≤ 1.
(1)
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Here ce and cu denote consumption in the employment and unemployment
states, and l denotes leisure in the employment state (in the unemployment
state leisure equals its maximum possible value 1.) Using the fact that in
equilibrium p = 1− φ, the first-order conditions for an interior solution can
be written compactly as10
Uc(c
e, l) = Uc(c
u, 1), (2)
Ul(c
e, l) = Uc(c
e, l). (3)
Equation (2) describes, given labor supply, the optimal insurance decision:
equalize the marginal utility of consumption in the unemployment and em-
ployment states (note that this implies cu = ce in the case with U(·, ·) sepa-
rable in c and l). Equation (3) characterizes, given the amount of insurance
bought by the consumer, her optimal consumption and leisure decisions:
equalize the wage rate (here set to 1) to the marginal rate of substitution
between leisure and consumption Ul/Uc.
11 Together with the budget con-
straints in (1), these two-first order conditions enable us to compute the
optimal (ce, cu, l, Q) under complete markets.
We now establish a basic, and intuitive, property of the consumer’s insurance
decision:
Lemma 1: If leisure is a normal good, then the demand for insurance is
10The Inada conditions guarantee that c and l are strictly positive at the optimum. To
make sure that the constraint l ≤ 1 is not binding, we need only impose that Ω be not
too large (otherwise the constraint l ≤ 1 binds and our consumer chooses never to work,
regardless of whether she is employed or not).
11One can readily verify that the implied consumption allocation coincides with the com-
mand optimum maxce,cu,l U(c
e, cu, l) subject to φce+(1− φ)cu = l+Ω. The competitive
equilibrium we describe is indeed a complete market equilibrium.
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strictly positive (Q > 0) in an interior solution with l < 1.
2.3 Incomplete markets
An unemployed consumer under incomplete markets just consumes her en-
dowment: cu,I = Ω, where variables superscripted I hereafter denote in-
complete market magnitudes. When she is employed, our consumer chooses
consumption and work eﬀort (ce,I , lI) so as to maximize U(ce,I , lI) subject
to
ce,I = Ω+ (1− lI), ce,I ≥ 0, 0 ≤ lI ≤ 1. (4)
The first-order condition for an interior solution is Ul(c
e,I , lI) = Uc(c
e,I , lI).
Together with the budget constraint (4), this first order condition enable us
to compute the optimal (ce,I , lI) under incomplete markets.
2.4 Labor supply under complete and incomplete markets
We are now ready to answer the question: does market incompleteness lead
consumers to work more or less than they would under complete markets?
The answer is provided by
Proposition 1: If leisure is a normal good (and for interior solutions), labor
supply is lower under incomplete markets than under complete markets (i.e.,
l < lI < 1).
The intuition is clear: in the same way that you are better oﬀ ex post if your
house does not burn and you have not bought fire insurance, consumers who
do end up in the employed state are richer ex post under incomplete mar-
kets than under complete markets–because they did not pay an insurance
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premium for an unrealized contingency!– and they will work less under
incomplete markets.12
As an example, that will be useful in section 4 to generate large eﬀects,
consider a separable utility function U(c, l) = u(c) + n(l). In this case eqs.
(3) and (4) imply that lI solves:
n0(lI) = u0[Ω+ (1− lI)] (5)
On the other hand, under complete markets we have that (1) and (2) imply
cu = Ω+ φQ = Ω− (1− φ)Q+ (1− l) = ce, (6)
while eqs. (1) and (3) imply
n0(l) = u0[Ω− (1− φ)Q+ (1− l)]. (7)
Equation (6) implies Q = 1− l. Substituting this into (7) we get
n0(l) = u0[Ω+ φ(1− l)]. (8)
Figure 1 displays the optimal choices of an agent in the employment state,
plotting both sides of equations (5) and (8).13 It is clear that l < lI . Also,
this figure suggests that the wealth eﬀect will be big if u is very concave (so
12This statement is most definitely only a statement about ex post wealth, and not
ex ante, wealth. But it is ex post wealth that matters for labor supply decisions under
incomplete markets.
13As in the general case, interiority of the solution is guaranteed, when u(·) and n(·)
satisfy Inada conditions, if Ω is not too large: u0(Ω) > n0(1).
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that u0 is very steep) and/or if n is close to being linear (so that n0 is nearly
flat). Therefore, we would expect a large wealth eﬀect when the curvature
of n is much smaller than the curvature of u.
We conclude that when labor supply is elastic there is a fundamental eco-
nomic mechanism–wealth eﬀects in labor supply–that tends to “shrink”
the size of incomplete market economies relative to complete markets. This
mechanism runs counter to the “enlarging” mechanisms (precautionary and/or
buﬀer stock saving) at the heart of the Aiyagari-Huggett eﬀect. It is there-
fore natural to ask how wealth eﬀects in labor supply may interact, in an
equilibrium multi-period model.
3 Dynamic Equilibrium
In this section, we set up an infinite horizon model with incomplete insurance
against idiosyncratic shocks. The model is inspired by Huggett (1997). We
keep Huggett’s notation, and draw on some of his results.
Agents maximize the expected value of discounted utility, which depends
on the infinite sequence of consumption and leisure, {ct, lt}∞t=0. Agents have
identical preferences and discount factor, and maximize E0
P∞
t=0 β
tU(ct, lt),
where the operator E0 denotes expectation with respect to the idiosyncratic
shocks conditional on information available at time 0. In addition to A1-
A2, we sometimes use assumption14
14Separability and homogeneity of A3 are suﬃcient to guarantee that the utility func-
tion is bounded from below, and that in equilibrium consumption and leisure are pro-
portional (see the interior first-order condition below). These assumptions simplify the
results based on dynamic programming, but the results are likely to go through for any
utility function in which consumption and leisure are both normal goods. In the analytic
example in Section 3.1 and in the numerical simulations in Section 4 we consider a more
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A3: U(c, l) = u(c)+n(l) is homogeneous of degree γ ∈ (0, 1), with u0(1) 6= 0
and n0(1) 6= 0.
Each agent is endowed with both a unit of time and a labor productiv-
ity endowment (or employment shock) st ∈ [0, 1]. There is only one asset
(capital) which may be used as a buﬀer to smooth out consumption in the
unemployment state. Thus, the budget constraint of the consumer reads
ct + kt ≤ (1 + rt)kt−1 +wtst(1− lt),
where (1+ rt) is the net interest factor from capital (i.e., the rental price of
capital plus undepreciated capital) and wt is the wage rate. The agent also
faces the constraints 0 ≤ lt ≤ 1 and ct ≥ 0, together with a borrowing limit
in capital holdings: kt ≥ B.
Output in period t is given by an aggregate production function f(K,H),
assumed to satisfy
A4: f displays constant returns to scale, with fj ≥ 0, fjj < 0.
We assume there is a single firm that maximizes profits each period taking
prices as given. This firm operates the technology for production, and rents
capital and labor from the agents. In equilibrium, the first order conditions
of the firm are given by
fK,t + 1− d = (1 + rt), and fH,t = wt, ∀t ≥ 0, (9)
where d ∈ (0, 1) is the depreciation rate of capital, and fK,t and fH,t stand
respectively for the marginal productivity of capital and labor evaluated at
general class of preferences.
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the optimal time t input levels.
Letting b(wt) ≡ [n0(1)/(wtu0(1))]1/(1−γ), the first-order conditions for the
leisure-labor choice of the consumer are
either :
ct
lt
= b(wt)
−1 st and lt < 1 (10)
or : ct ≥ b(wt)−1 st and lt = 1, (11)
while the first-order conditions for capital in the consumer problem are
either : Uc,t = β(1 + rt+1) Et(Uc,t+1) and kt > B (12)
or : Uc,t ≥ β(1 + rt+1) Et(Uc,t+1) and kt = B. (13)
3.1 An analytic example: one-time uncertainty
The following example demonstrates how the wealth eﬀect induced by id-
iosyncratic shocks may have a large eﬀect in the long-run behavior of a
multi-period equilibrium economy. Specifically, in the example, the ex post
wealth eﬀect always makes output and capital under incomplete markets
smaller than under complete markets.
Consider two ex ante identical consumers indexed i = 1, 2 with preferences
given by U(ci, li) = log ci + A log li. To maintain ex-ante symmetry we
assume that initial wealth is equal for both agents: k1−1 = k
2
−1. Assume
also that the aggregate production function is Cobb-Douglas f(K,H) =
KαH1−α.
The nature of idiosyncratic employment shocks is the following. In the initial
period t = 0, agents have the same productivity s10 = s
2
0 = 1/2. In the next
12
period t = 1, a shock to productivity occurs, and one of the agents has
productivity 1 and the other has productivity 0. The agent who turns out
to be (un)productive at t = 1 remains (un)productive forever. Formally,
s11 + s
2
1 = 1,
P (s11 = 1) = P (s
1
1 = 0) = 0.5,
sit = s
i
t−1 for all t > 1, i = 1, 2.
This stochastic structure could be the result of a once-and-for-all regime
shift in period 1 which would permanently, but unequally, aﬀect the labor
productivity of workers in the population, making some workers more pro-
ductive and others unproductive. For example, this economy may open to
foreign trade at t = 1, or a skill-biased-technological shock may occur, or a
natural resource may be discovered in some region, but which part of the
population will be favored by the shock is not known beforehand.15
Under complete markets, agents insure perfectly against the shock, so that in
period t = 0 they exchange bonds contingent on the realization of s11. Sym-
metry implies that both agents consume the same amount in each period.
In period t = 1, after the shock is realized, the unemployed agent receives
the payoﬀ stipulated by the bond in case he ends up being unproductive.
In equilibrium, this payment enables the unemployed agent to forever con-
sume the same amount as the employed agent, even though he remains
15This stochastic and population structure diﬀers from the one in the next subsection.
The first diﬀerence is that here the shock is permanent across time. The second diﬀerence
is that the shock here is perfectly positively correlated among half of the population, and
perfectly negatively correlated with the other half of the population, while in the next
subsection it will be independent across agents.
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unemployed forever. In other words, both agents consume the same amount
in all periods because they insured against the possibility of (permanent)
unemployment in period 0.
Under incomplete markets, agents cannot insure perfectly. Once the shock
is realized, the employed agent forever receives, in addition to his capital
income, all the labor income in the economy. However, the unemployed
agent receives only capital income. The employed agent is now richer than
he would have been in a complete markets world, because he did not insure
at time t = 0. Since he is wealthier, he enjoys higher consumption and
leisure than in the complete markets case. Hence, the total number of hours
worked is less under incomplete markets than under complete markets. For
some parameter values, the wealth eﬀect of market incompleteness is so
strong that it lowers long-run output and savings by half.
We now prove this formally. We use the subscript ∞ to indicate the long-
run value of a variable, so that, for a variable x, x∞ ≡ limt→∞ xt. When
necessary, we use subscripts I and C to denote incomplete and complete
market variables.
Proposition 2:
a) Under complete markets both agents consume the same in all periods, so
that c1,Ct = c
2,C
t for all t ≥ 0.
Under incomplete markets the ratio of individual consumptions is constant
from t=1 onwards, and consumption of the employed agent is larger:
c1,It
c2,It
= λ < 1 for all t ≥ 1. (14)
14
b) Long-run output, savings (i.e., capital), and hours worked are larger under
complete markets16: YI∞ < Y
C
∞, K
I
∞ < K
C
∞, H
I
∞ < H
C
∞.
c) Consider diﬀerent parameter values. As we vary α:
lim
α→0
HI∞
HC∞
,
KI∞
KC∞
,
Y I∞
Y C∞
=
A+ 2
2 (A+ 1)
.
If, in addition, we vary A :
lim
A→∞,α→0
HI∞
HC∞
,
KI∞
KC∞
,
Y I∞
Y C∞
=
1
2
.
Part c) of this proposition says that the wealth eﬀect is magnified when
labor input is highly productive relative to capital (low α) and when agents
have a high preference for leisure (high A). In the language of intermediate
micro, the wealth eﬀect becomes larger when labor demand is high and labor
supply is low.
In the foregoing example, there is no room for the precautionary savings
eﬀect of Aiyagari and Huggett to “enlarge” the economy under incomplete
markets, since there is no uncertainty left after period t = 1. Both eﬀects
(the shrinking of the incomplete market economy due to the wealth eﬀect,
and the Aiyagari-Huggett enlargement eﬀect due to precautionary saving)
are however present in the next model.
16Formulas for long run output, savings and employment can be found in the proof in
Appendix A.
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3.2 Stationary uncertainty
We now assume a continuum of agents uniformly distributed in the unit in-
terval. We also assume that labor productivity endowments follow a Markov
chain with transition probabilities πs0|s. As in Section 2, with a continuum
of agents there is uncertainty at the individual level but there is no aggregate
uncertainty. Furthermore, we assume that idiosyncratic uncertainty follows
a Markov process:
A5: st ∈ S ≡ {1, 0} with Ps0 πs0|s = 1 and πs0|s > 0 for all s, s0 ∈ S.
Furthermore, π1|1 ≥ π1|0.
Finally, we consider the case where an agent faces a deterministic sequence
of constant prices, so that rt = r and wt = w for all t.
3.2.1 Characterization of decision rules
As the utility function is unbounded above, we need to introduce an upper
bound B¯ on capital holdings to guarantee existence of the Bellman equation
in the usual way. We study the agent’s problem using standard dynamic
programming techniques. The position at a point in time of an agent is
described by x = (k, s) that belong to the state space X = [B, B¯] × S.
Letting v be the value function, the problem of an agent can be written
recursively as
v(x;w, r) = sup
(c,l,k0)∈Γ(x;w,r)
{U(c, l) + βE[v(x0;w, r)|x]}, (15)
16
where
Γ(x;w, r) = {(c, l, k0) : c+ k0 ≤ ws(1− l) + (1 + r)k;
c, l ≥ 0; l ≤ 1, and B ≤ k0 ≤ B¯}.
The following results are an extension of Huggett (1993, 1997), and charac-
terize some features of the value function and optimal decision rules (note
that since (w, 1 + r) are constant by assumption, we simplify notation and
remove them from the value function and decision rules).
Remarks: Assume A1-A5, (w, 1 + r) > 0 and β(1 + r) ≤ 1. Then:
R1: v(x) is strictly increasing and strictly concave in k, and c(x), l(x) and
k(x) are continuous in k.
R2: c(x), l(x) and k(x) are strictly positive, c(k, s) is strictly increasing in
k and k(k, s) and l(k, 1) are increasing in k.
R3: For all k ∈ [B, B¯], k(k, 0) ≤ k (with strict inequality if B < k < B¯ and
β(1 + r) < 1).
The following Proposition characterizes more sharply the policy function
k(k, s).
Proposition 3: Assume A1-A5 and w > 0. Then:
a) If β(1 + r) ≤ 1, for any k ≤ k¯ then k(k, s) ≤ k¯.
b) If β(1 + r) = 1, for any k ≥ k¯ we have k(k, s) = k, l(k, s) = 1 and
c(k, s) = kr.
c) If β(1 + r) = 1 and k−1 ≤ k¯ , then kt → k¯ and lt → 1 (a.s.).
Part c) of the Proposition exhibits the wealth eﬀect on labor supply in
17
a partial equilibrium version of the model. It says that if β(1 + r) = 1,
then capital accumulation in the long run is bounded, unlike the case of
exogenous labor where savings go to infinity (as in the papers by Aiyagari
and Huggett). In our model, capital converges to k¯ ≡ (b(w)r)−1, and at
this level of capital the agent can maintain a consumption stream equal to
b(w)−1 without working.
The following remark follows immediately from part a) of Proposition 3:
R4: If we choose B¯ > k¯ and if k−1 ≤ k¯, then the upper limit on capital is
never binding.
This implies that the upper bound on capital that was introduced to obtain
existence and uniqueness of the value function is, in fact, not binding under
the conditions of the remark.
Figure 2 displays the typical shape of decisions rules for capital accumulation
assuming the interest rate is equal to the rate of time preference. The Figure
and part c) of Proposition 3 reflect another aspect of the wealth eﬀect that
drives the results in this paper: if β(1 + r) = 1, an agent will not supply
any labor if she becomes suﬃciently rich. At the same time, and contrary
to the results by Aiyagari and Huggett, capital does not go to infinity.
3.2.2 Stationary equilibrium
Let ψ be the aggregate state describing in any period t the mass of agents
in each possible state. Thus the aggregate state is a probability measure
(time-invariant in a stationary equilibrium) defined on the sets X , the Borel
subsets of X. Call P (x,M) the transition function giving the probability
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that a worker in individual state x at time t will have an individual state
that lies in the setM ∈ X next period.17 Finally, letK(ψ) andH(ψ) denote
the aggregate stock of capital and labor as a function of the aggregate state
ψ. We introduce next the notion of stationary competitive equilibrium for
the economy.
Definition: A stationary recursive competitive equilibrium with incomplete
markets is a list of functions (v, c, l, k,ψ,K,H) and a pair of prices (w, r)
such that:
(1) v satisfies the functional equation in (15) and c(x), l(x) and k(x) are
the associated optimal decision rules given (w, r).
(2) {wt, rt} = {w, r} satisfy (9) for all t ≥ 0.
(3) Aggregate factor inputs are generated by decision rules of the agents:
(i)
R
X k(x)dψ = K(ψ),
(ii)
R
X s(1− l(x))dψ = H(ψ).
(4) ψ is a stationary distribution in the law of motion determined by the
transition P implied by the decision rules. Formally, ψ(M) =
R
X P (x,M)dψ
for all M in X .
The following result extends Theorem 1 in Huggett (1997), and establishes
the relationship between the rate of time preference and the interest rate in
a stationary equilibrium.
Proposition 4: Assume A1-A5. In a stationary recursive competitive
equilibrium with positive capital and labor β(1 + r) < 1. Therefore, K
I
∞
HI∞
>
KC∞
HC∞
.
17For a construction of the transition function, see Theorem 9.13 in Stokey and Lucas
(1989, pg. 284).
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The intuition for this proposition is the following. From part c) of Propo-
sition 3, we know that if β(1 + r) = 1 then the capital labor ratio goes to
infinity, so that (9) cannot be satisfied. The interest rate has to be smaller
than the rate of time preference in order for markets to clear. At any of those
steady states the distribution of wealth is uniquely determined.18 Since un-
der complete markets β(1 + r) = 1, then we have that the capital labor
ratio is larger under incomplete markets. But the ex post wealth eﬀect we
have described at length in this paper decreases total labor, so that total
capital and output may be lower under incomplete markets depending on
which eﬀect dominates. In the following section we use numerical methods
to investigate this issue in several examples.
4 Simulations with repeated uncertainty
The functional form for technology we use for all numerical simulations is
Cobb-Douglas:
f(K,H) = TKαH1−α, (16)
where T is a scale parameter and where αmeasures the capital output share.
4.1 Non-separable utility
We first use the following parametric class of utility functions:
U(c, l) =
³
[ηc−σ + (1− η)l−σ]−1/σ
´1−γ
− 1
1− γ , (17)
18The arguments in Huggett (1993), based on Theorem 2 in Hopenhayn and Prescott
(1992), can be readily applied to the endogenous labor case considered in this paper.
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where η ∈ (0, 1), γ > 0 and −1 < σ 6= 0. Limiting values for σ and γ provide
particular cases commonly used, namely
lim
σ→0
U(c, l) =
£
cηl1−η
¤1−γ − 1
1− γ , (18)
where the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is 1/γ and where η is the
share parameter for leisure in the composite commodity. We also have that
lim
γ→1
µ
lim
σ→0
U(c, l)
¶
= log c+A log l, (19)
the often used log utility where A = (1 − η)/η. Thus with the functional
form in (17) we can study the eﬀect of intertemporal substitution of the
composite commodity (governed by γ), as well as the eﬀect of intratem-
poral substitution between consumption and leisure (governed by σ). In
the benchmark calibration we fix T = 0.5 and the usual values β = 0.99,
α = 0.36, η = 0.33, and d = 0.025 to roughly match quarterly observations
of the US economy on interest rates, hours worked, and the capital output
ratio.
We start by setting π1|1 = π1|0 = 0.5, andB = 1. These values are somewhat
arbitrary and are chosen to reduce the size of the state space and guarantee
suﬃcient accuracy with the solution method that we use (see footnote 20
below and Appendix B for further details).
Table 1 reports aggregate capital, labor, the capital-labor ratio, output and
saving rate in the competitive equilibrium with and without complete mar-
kets for σ = 0.01 and several values of γ. The message of this Table is clear:
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the lower γ, the more likely it is that the wealth eﬀect dominates and that
output and savings are lower under IM. Notice that IM output is always
lower for all the values of γ reported in this table, but that IM savings are
higher for the two larger values of γ (Appendix B shows how for higher val-
ues of γ IM output can be higher). The results in this table are motivated
by the observation that the result β(1 + r) < 1 in a stationary equilibrium
depends on having a high γ, i.e., a low intertemporal substitution.
Let us be more precise: consider a case when Uc,t = 1 with probability
one as is the case, for example, if U(c, l) = c + n(l). Then (12) implies
that the only possibility for IM equilibrium is β(1 + r) = 1 (unless all
agents are credit constrained). Hence in this case the Aiyagari-Huggett
eﬀect disappears and the capital/labor ratio must be the same as under
CM. For the utility function (17) one can expect that as γ → 0 and σ →
−1 the interest rate becomes closer to satisfy β(1 + r) = 1, since utility
becomes linear at the limit. Therefore, we expect that for lower γ’s the IM
capital/labor ratio is closer to CM, as can be seen from the Table. Hence,
lower γ’s imply a smaller Aiyagari-Huggett eﬀect and it is more likely that
the wealth eﬀect dominates.
Table 2 shows that lower values of σ also make it more likely that the wealth
eﬀect dominates. The intuition we can oﬀer goes along the same lines as
in the previous table: lower σ makes the utility “more linear” so that the
Aiyagari-Huggett eﬀect is smaller and there is more room for the wealth
eﬀect to dominate.
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4.2 Separable utility
In the examples reported in Table 3, we apply the intuition drawn from the
separable utility functions considered in Section 2, and we therefore specify
U(c, l) = c1−γc/(1− γc) +Al1−γl/(1− γl).
Confirming that the static intuition of Figure 1 carries over to a dynamic
stochastic setting, we observe that the wealth eﬀect dominates by a larger
amount for low curvature with respect to leisure. For the lowest curvature
reported, CM capital is almost 14% larger than under IM, and CM output
per capita is about 18% larger.
4.3 Sensitivity
Next, we return to the utility function (17) and examine the sensitivity of
our results to changes in the lower bound on savings B and the probabilities
π. We find that the stock of capital declines when we decrease the value
of B. In Table 4 we report output and capital under incomplete markets
for several B in a model with σ = 0.2 and γ = 1.001.19 The corresponding
stationary allocation under complete markets is y∗ = 0.319 and k∗ = 3.28.
This Table suggests that in a calibration where the Aiyagari-Huggett eﬀect
dominates, lowering B helps the economy to “complete the markets” in the
sense that both the level of aggregate savings and output become closer to
19This example is fully documented in Appendix B. We choose these values of γ and σ
because in the benchmark calibration there was “precautionary saving” and output was
larger under incomplete markets (see Table 6). We obtained similar results under other
parameter values.
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the complete markets allocation. We also find that the value of capital such
that k(k, 1) = k in the employment state tends to increase as we decrease
the value of B. For instance, the largest amount of capital with B = 1 is
about 24.24 units, whereas with B = 0.73 it is about 33 units.20 Visual
inspection of the typical decision rules for capital reveals that they appear
to be remarkably close to the 45 degrees line. Except near the borrowing
limit, there is no strong incentive to sacrifice current consumption for a
larger accumulation of capital when the agent is employed, and when the
agent is unemployed the stock of capital decreases very slowly.
With respect to the probabilities of employment, we find that by increasing
these probabilities the diﬀerences between complete and incomplete markets
tend to be smaller. For instance, in the model with σ = 0.2, γ = 1.001 and
B = 1, we find that with π1|1 = π1|0 = 0.55 the diﬀerence between the stock
of capital under incomplete and complete markets is still positive but it
reduces to 0.018, and the diﬀerence in output reduces to 0.00011. As before,
we also find that the k(k, 1) = k increases with the probabilities of transition.
We can oﬀer two intuitive explanations: first, with a low probability of
being employed, the premium that would be paid under complete markets
for unemployment insurance would be high, so those who end up being
employed under incomplete markets are very rich (compared to complete
markets) and thus the wealth eﬀect is larger. Furthermore, with a higher
20This fact makes the computation of equilibrium increasingly diﬃcult because then the
decision rule for capital in the employment state does not cross the 45 degrees line. The
obvious alternative would be to increase the distance between gridpoints, at the cost of
loosing accuracy. This loss is not negligible, because in general, we find that increasing
the distance between points, the capital labor ratio under incomplete markets is always
smaller than the one under complete markets, even for interest rates arbitrarily close (from
below) to the rate of time preference.
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π1|1 = π1|0 the serial correlation of labor income is higher, and as reported
in Table II of Aiyagari (1994), the Aiyagari-Huggett eﬀect is stronger.
The results in the previous tables suggest that it is possible to construct
examples with uninsurable idiosyncratic risk and yet, there is no “precau-
tionary saving” and output is smaller than under complete markets. In some
cases (see Table 3) the results are very sizeable. In those examples, com-
pleting the markets would not only increase welfare, but also output would
rise.
4.4 Calibration
Finally, we report the results when the employment probabilities are cali-
brated to the US economy with the preferences (19). In this case we assume
π1|1 = 0.94 and π1|0 = 0.91. These values are similar to the ones in Imro-
horoglu (1989) and approximately match the 93% average employment rate
(after normalizing with the participation rate) and the 13-week average du-
ration of unemployment observed in the US economy since the Korean War
(parameter values for β, η, δ, α and T are as before). In Table 5 we report
the results for the US economy under several B.
Clearly the diﬀerences between complete and incomplete markets are rather
small in this Table, but we see again that capital and output under incom-
plete markets become smaller than under complete markets as we lower B
(in spite of the large probabilities of employment). It would seem that,
in this case, as we “make the markets more complete” by lowering B, the
Aiyagari-Huggett eﬀect quickly becomes less important, while the wealth
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eﬀect persists and ends up dominating.21
5 Concluding remarks
We have shown that low financial development may decrease output and
savings if endogenous labor eﬀort is taken into account. This occurs because,
under incomplete markets, uninsured shocks create an ex post wealth eﬀect
that reduces labor supply. We have demonstrated that this wealth eﬀect is
present in various setups.
The wealth eﬀect often (but not always) dominates, so that incomplete mar-
kets output and savings are lower. Sometimes the eﬀect is very large, as in
the analytic example of subsection 3.1 or as in Table 3. These results sug-
gest that the eﬀect is particularly sizeable when labor demand is large, labor
supply is low, and when the curvature of the utility with respect to labor
is low. In numerical examples with stationary uncertainty the eﬀects vary
substantially depending on parameter values. When employment probabili-
ties are calibrated to the US economy, we find that the saving rate increases
under incomplete markets as in Table II of Aiyagari (1994) in a model with
exogenous labor, but the changes in output we report are... of the opposite
sign (the wealth eﬀect dominates when the lower bound on savings goes
21One would think that for the most interesting case of B = 0, the wealth eﬀect would
dominate even more strongly. But as we explain in Appendix B, it is diﬃcult to solve this
model for low B and, in particular, we cannot reach numerical solutions when B = 0 as we
would desire. There are two computational problems in computing this equilibrium. First,
the law of motion for capital is very close to the 45 degree line, and a small computational
inaccuracy leads to a very diﬀerent long-run average of capital. Second, the marginal
utility reaches arbitrarily high values with positive probability. Any algorithm will have
problems computing accurately the equilibrium under these circumstances.
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down).22
It is still an open question whether this decrease in output is empirically
relevant. Models a` la Krusell, Smith, Huggett and Aiyagari, like the one in
sections 3 and 4, are now standard in the literature of incomplete markets
with idiosyncratic uncertainty. We wanted to stay as close as possible to this
paradigm. These models are the heirs of the RBC literature that became
standard in aggregate macroeconomics research during the 80’s and 90’s,
but they are possibly not the best models to calibrate the wealth elastic-
ity of labor supply. Furthermore, various generalizations or deviations from
these models may display a larger eﬀect of uncertainty on output. For exam-
ple, the supply of other inputs (such as innovation, technology acquisition,
human capital, managerial skills, etc.) may be more sensitive to random
productivity shocks than the supply of labor, and the eﬀect on output may
be much more important if these inputs are considered. There may be other
frictions that matter for savings and that have been left out of the model.
Finally, Aiyagari (1995) argued that the precautionary savings eﬀect of in-
complete markets has implications over fiscal policy and that it would justify
taxing capital income. Our results suggest that Aiyagari’s arguments should
be reevaluated.
This all leaves a lot of room for future research, but our results do suggest
that equilibrium dynamic stochastic models can be used to understand the
relationship between uncertainty, financial markets, and the wealth of a
22Aiyagari says “...the diﬀerences between the saving rates with and without insurance
are quite small for moderate and empirically plausible values of σ, ρ, and µ. ... (but in an
extreme case, it) ... leads to a considerable increase in the saving rate of almost fourteen
points”. We also get small diﬀerences in the US calibration, but we get a diﬀerence in
output of 18% in Table 3 and of 100% in the example of section 3.1.
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country, since they are generally consistent with the empirical evidence that
higher financial development goes along with higher output and savings.
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6 Appendix A
Proof of Lemma 1
Consider the problem maxc,l U(c, l) subject to c = ω+(1−l). The first-order
condition for an interior solution is Ul(c, l) = Uc(c, l). Manipulation of this
first-order condition establishes that leisure is a normal good if and only if
∂l/∂ω = (Ucc−Ucl)/(Ucc−2Ucl+Ull) > 0. Since the second-order condition
for a maximum imposes that the denominator of this expression be negative,
normality of leisure requires that Ucc − Ucl < 0. Combining these results
with the first-order condition (2) we have:
Uc[Ω+ φQ, 1] = Uc[Ω− (1− φ)Q+ (1− l), l] < Uc[Ω− (1− φ)Q, 1],
Now Ucc is strictly negative by assumption. Therefore the previous equation
implies that Q > 0.
Proof of Proposition 1
Labor supply under complete markets satisfies
Ul[Ω− (1− φ)Q+ (1− l), l] = Uc[Ω− (1− φ)Q+ (1− l), l], (20)
while labor supply under incomplete markets solves
Ul[Ω+ (1− li), li] = Uc[Ω+ (1− li), li]. (21)
Comparing equation (21) with (20), we observe the incomplete and complete
market labor supply decisions diﬀer only in that consumers who do work are
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richer under incomplete markets than under complete markets, since Q > 0,
and thus, Ω > Ω− (1− φ)Q. Hence we conclude that, if leisure is a normal
good, labor supply is lower under incomplete markets than under complete
markets.
Proof of Proposition 2
a) Under complete markets the solution can be inferred from a planner’s
problem. Since agents are ex-ante identical they each receive the same weight
in the planner’s problem so the complete markets solution can be found by
maximizing E0
P
βt[U(c1t , l
1
t ) + U(c
2
t , l
2
t )] subject to feasibility. For the log-
log utility function of this example, the FOC of this planner’s problem imply
consumption of both agents is the same.
Under incomplete markets, since for t > 1 there is no randomness we have
Et(U
i
c,t+1) = U
i
c,t+1 for all t > 1. Dividing (12) for i = 1 by the equation for
i = 2 for each t > 0 proves the equality in (14).
To prove the inequality in (14), substitute forward in the budget constraint
of agent i from period t = 1 onwards to obtain the usual (now deterministic)
expression of the constraint in terms of discounted present value
ki,I0 r
I
1 +
∞X
j=0


jY
τ=1
(1 + rIτ )


−1
si1w
I
1+j(1− l
i,I
1+j) =
∞X
j=0


jY
τ=1
(1 + rIτ )


−1
ci,I1+j.
(22)
It is clear that the discounted value of labor income of the unemployed
agent is zero but it is positive for the employed agent. Since both agents are
symmetric at t = 0 they choose k1,I0 = k
2,I
0 . Therefore, the left hand side of
(22) is strictly larger for the employed agent, the right hand side must be
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larger for the employed agent, so that consumption of the employed agent
must be higher and λ < 1.
Now we prove part b). Under A4 we know that in the long run the model
converges to the steady state. The steady state can be found in a standard
way to obtain:
KI∞
HI∞
=
KC∞
HC∞
=
h³
β−1 − 1 + d
´
α−1
i 1
α−1 . (23)
To obtain a formula for H
I
∞
HC∞
notice that the FOC for the consumption-leisure
decision and (9) give
ce,I∞
le,I∞
=
ce,C∞
le,C∞
=
"
KI∞
HI∞
#α
1− α
A
,
and using part a) the feasibility condition gives
(1 + λ)ce,I∞ + dK
I
∞ =
³
KI∞
´α
(HI∞)
1−α,
2ce,C∞ + dK
C
∞ =
³
KC∞
´α
(HC∞)
1−α.
Combining these three equations and (23) we have
(1 + λ)
"
KI∞
HI∞
#α
1− α
A
(1−HI∞) + d
KI∞
HI∞
HI∞ =
"
KI∞
HI∞
#α
HI∞,
2
"
KI∞
HI∞
#α
1− α
A
(1−HC∞) + d
KI∞
HI∞
HC∞ =
"
KI∞
HI∞
#α
HC∞.
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Solving for the H’s and rearranging gives
HI∞
HC∞
=
1 + λ
2
A
³
1− dα
β−1−1+d
´
+ (1− α) 2
A
³
1− dα
β−1−1+d
´
+ (1− α) (1 + λ)
. (24)
Now, notice that
r1k
1,I
0 = α
Ã
KI0
HI1
!α−1
k1,I0 ≤
α
2
³
KI0
´α
≤ α
¡
Kα−1 + (1− d)K−1
¢α
,
where the first equality is from the equilibrium formula for r, the following
inequality follows from k10 = k
2
0 and H ≤ 1, and the last inequality from the
feasibility constraint. Therefore, taking the limit in the right of the above
equation, if α→ 0 then r1k1,I0 → 0. Hence, if α→ 0 then (22) implies that
cU,It → 0 and λ → 0. Taking the limit in (24) as α,λ → 0 implies part b).
Part c) of the proposition follows immediately.
Proof of Remarks
The assumptions on U(c) and n(l) imply that the utility function is bounded
below by 0. Since capital is bounded above by B¯, by standard arguments
there exists a unique function v(x) in the space of bounded continuous func-
tions on X satisfying the functional equation (15), and there also exist the
corresponding optimal decision rules (see respectively Theorem 9.6 in Stokey
and Lucas (1989) and Corollary 2 in Denardo (1967)). The proofs for R1 to
R3 use these facts and follow from the same arguments as in Huggett 1993
(p. 964-68) and 1997 (p. 399-400).
Proof of Proposition 3
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To prove a), First consider the case r > 0. Following the proof of Theorem 1
in Huggett (1993), under A1-A4 and k ∈ [B, B¯] it can be shown by induction
that v0(k, 1) ≤ v0(k, 0), i.e., c(k, 0) ≤ c(k, 1). For an agent in the unemploy-
ment state, R3 and the budget constraint imply that c(k¯, 0) ≥ b(w)−1. Since
c(k¯, 0) ≤ c(k¯, 1), then the FONC with respect to leisure implies l(k¯, 1) = 1.
Therefore k(k¯, 1) ≤ k¯.
r ≤ 0: Take k1 < k2, thus c(k1, 1) < c(k2, 1). The budget constraint of
an employed agent implies that w(1 − l(k1, 1)) + (1 + r)k1 − k(k1, 1) <
w(1− l(k2, 1)) + (1 + r)k2 − k(k2, 1), thus k(k2, 1)− k(k1, 1) < (1 + r)(k2 −
k1)+w(l(k1, 1)− l(k2, 1)). Since leisure is also strictly increasing in the level
of capital, it follows that (k(k2, 1)− k(k1, 1))/(k2 − k1) < 1.
To prove b), consider the optimal choice of {ct, lt, kt} in the consumer prob-
lem when the initial condition satisfies k−1 ≥ k. It is immediate to check that
the allocation
nect,elt, ekto = {k−1r, 1, k−1} satisfies all first order conditions
for any s. The FOC for labor are satisfied because ect = k−1r ≥ kr = b(w)−1
and the FOC for capital are also satisfied because Uc,t is constant. Since the
problem is concave the first order conditions are suﬃcient for an optimum.
Since the policy function gives the optimum, we have that for k−1 ≥ k it must
hold that c(k−1, s) = ec0 = k−1r, l(k−1, s) = el0 = 1, and k(k−1, s) = ek0 = k−1
To prove c), notice first that part a) implies that kt ≤ k¯ for all t, and R2
together with part b) imply that ct ≤ c(k, s) = k¯r so that consumption is
bounded a.s. Notice that the FOC for capital (12) and (13) imply that uc,t ≥
Et(uc,t+1) a.s., so that uc,t is a super-martingale. Since uc,t is bounded below
by u0(k¯r) the martingale convergence theorem applies and it implies that uc,t
converges a.s. to a random variable. Assume, towards a contradiction, that
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uc,t converged to a value strictly larger than u
0(k¯r), consumption would
converge to a point cl < b(w)−1 so that we would have an interior solution
for the consumption-leisure decision of employed agents and (10) applies if
st = 1. Under these circumstances labor income would converge to w(1 −
b(w)cl)st, which is a non-degenerate i.i.d. random variable with positive
variance. The arguments in Chamberlain and Wilson (2000) imply that the
lower or upper bounds on capital will be violated with positive probability in
this case, to that it is impossible for uc,t to converge to a value strictly larger
than u0(k¯r). Therefore, the only possibility is that uc,t converges to u0(k¯r)
and, since u0 is invertible, consumption converges to b(w)−1. The budget
constraint implies that kt must converge to k¯.
Proof of Proposition 4
By the usual arguments (e.g., Aiyagari 1994, Chamberlain andWilson 2000),
if β(1+r) > 1 consumption converges to infinity which is unfeasible. Propo-
sition 3 c) implies that if β(1 + r) = 1 then capital is bounded but labor
goes to zero for each agent. Therefore, the aggregate capital/labor ratio
goes to infinity for each initial distribution of wealth, which is incompatible
with equilibrium and (9). Therefore, the only possibility for existence of a
stationary equilibrium under incomplete markets is that β(1+r) < 1. Since
β(1 + r) = 1 under complete markets, then we have that the capital labor
ratio must be larger for incomplete markets if (9) is to be satisfied.
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7 Appendix B
The method we use to solve for an equilibrium of incomplete markets involves
three iterative steps: 1) given an interest rate we determine the correspond-
ing capital labor ratio and wage rate (this is always possible with a constant
returns to scale technology as input prices in equilibrium depend only on
the capital labor ratio), and we find decision rules that solves an agent’s
problem; 2) given these rules, we simulate them over a large number of pe-
riods and we find the implied capital labor ratio; 3) given the new capital
labor ratio, update input prices using the bisection method as explained in
Aiyagari (1994). The procedure continues until the interest rate implied by
the supply side of capital/labor is approximately equal to the interest rate
in the demand side.
Step one is based on dynamic programming and follows Huggett (1993).
The algorithm finds decision rules for capital and leisure by approximating
the derivative of the value function with piece-wise linear functions on a
grid of points for state variables. This method allows for choosing capital
levels not in the grid. In practice we use a grid of 1,500 points for capital,
where the distance between the first 10 points is 0.005 and the distance
between the remaining points is between 0.019 and 0.022 (we make sure
that the decision rule for capital in the employment state, k(k, 1), crosses
the 45 degrees line). In our application we approximate decision rules up
to the 10−7 decimal point. We use 500,000 time periods in the integration
by simulation of decision rules, and equilibrium interest rates vary less than
0.0005%, thus the equilibrium capital labor ratio varies less than 0.003. The
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equilibrium with complete markets can be determined directly using the first
order and feasibility conditions which deliver a non linear equation in one
unknown. We solve this equation using the Newton method.
We have detected some inaccuracies in the method used to compute the
examples, mainly, that with a large distance between grid-points we tend to
underestimate the stock of capital. In the examples reported in the text we
try to minimize these inaccuracies by using a large number of points and a
small distance between them. The problem with this approach is that there
are calibrations for which we cannot compute an accurate equilibrium, for
instance, with large σ, large probabilities of transition, and small borrowing
limits. In those cases the k(k, 1) = k in the employment state becomes very
large and the decision rule does not cross the 45 degrees line. Furthermore,
increasing the distance between points in general does not help because then,
the capital labor ratio under incomplete markets is always smaller than the
one under complete markets, even for interest rates arbitrarily close (from
below) to the rate of time preference. The case of small γ is also diﬃcult
to solve because then the right and left hand side of the Euler Equation do
not cross.
In the second step of the computations we have tried two approaches with
similar, though not identical, results. The first one is to find the ergodic
distribution of agents over states and use it to integrate decision rules for
capital and labor (Huggett (1993) describes this method in detail). The
second procedure integrates decision rules by simulation exploiting ergodic-
ity. In some experiments we find that the first approach produces slightly
smaller amounts of capital and slightly larger capital labor ratios. Precisely
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for this reason we choose to use the second approach, for which we find
essentially the same results with 300,000 and 500,000 time periods.
Finally, the bisection method used to update the interest rate does not
always converge, as supply curves of capital and labor shift when prices
change. The reason is that the distribution of agents over states depends
on prices. However, the method is very useful to bracket a narrow interval
from which we can “hunt” the approximate market clearing interest rate.
The following Tables 6 to 7 report additional examples corresponding to the
general class of preferences in (17).
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Table 1: Equilibrium allocations with several γ.
γ = 1.01 1.1 1.2 1.3
C.M. I.M. C.M. I.M. C.M. I.M. C.M. I.M.
k 2.986 2.966 2.958 2.952 2.93 2.931 2.905 2.912
h 0.232 0.23 0.23 0.228 0.227 0.226 0.225 0.224
k/h 12.861 12.895 12.861 12.943 12.861 12.967 12.861 12.985
y 0.291 0.288 0.288 0.286 0.285 0.284 0.283 0.282
sr 0.256 0.256 0.256 0.257 0.256 0.257 0.256 0.257
Note: Equilibrium under complete markets (C.M.) and incomplete markets (I.M.). In
all experiments B = 1, σ = 0.01 and π1|1 = π1|0 = 0.5.
Table 2: Equilibrium allocations with several σ.
σ = 0.0001 0.001 0.01 0.1
C.M. I.M. C.M. I.M. C.M. I.M. C.M. I.M.
k 2.972 2.952 2.973 2.954 2.989 2.97 3.137 3.172
h 0.231 0.228 0.231 0.229 0.232 0.23 0.243 0.242
k/h 12.861 12.894 12.861 12.896 12.861 12.897 12.861 13.105
y 0.289 0.287 0.289 0.287 0.291 0.289 0.305 0.305
sr 0.256 0.256 0.256 0.256 0.256 0.256 0.256 0.259
Note: same as Table 1 except γ = 1.001 and σ varies.
Table 3: Equilibrium allocations.
γl = 0.7 0.5
C.M. I.M. C.M. I.M.
k 3.582 3.305 3.921 3.448
h 0.278 0.245 0.304 0.253
k/h 12.861 13.475 12.861 13.579
y 0.349 0.312 0.382 0.324
sr 0.256 0.264 0.256 0.265
Note: same as Table 1 except γc = 1.1.
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Table 4: Equilibrium allocations with several B.
B= 1 .9 .8 .73
y k y k y k y k
I.M. 0.322 3.388 0.321 3.357 0.319 3.312 0.318 3.291
Note: same as Table 1 σ = 0.2 and γ = 1.001.
Table 5: Equilibrium allocations for the US economy.
k h k/h y sr
C.M. 3.7944 0.295 12.8617 0.3699 0.2564
I.M. (B = 2.7) 3.7973 0.2949 12.876 0.3699 0.2565
I.M. (B = 2.67) 3.7957 0.2949 12.8711 0.3699 0.2565
I.M. (B = 2.64) 3.7936 0.2949 12.8639 0.3698 0.2564
I.M. (B = 2.61) 3.793 0.2948 12.8627 0.3698 0.2564
Equilibrium for the log utility case with π1|1 = 0.94 and π1|0 = 0.91,
and several B.
Table 6: Equilibrium allocations with several σ (cont. Table 1).
σ = 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
C.M. I.M. C.M. I.M. C.M. I.M. C.M. I.M.
k 3.28 3.388 3.405 3.456 3.514 3.628 3.61 3.708
h 0.255 0.253 0.264 0.262 0.273 0.271 0.28 0.278
k/h 12.861 13.366 12.861 13.161 12.861 13.38 12.861 13.32
y 0.319 0.322 0.332 0.332 0.342 0.344 0.352 0.353
sr 0.256 0.262 0.256 0.26 0.256 0.262 0.256 0.262
Table 7: Equilibrium allocations with several γ (cont. Table 2).
γ = 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.7
C.M. I.M. C.M. I.M. C.M. I.M. C.M. I.M.
k 2.882 2.862 2.862 2.878 2.843 2.855 2.825 2.855
h 0.224 0.222 0.222 0.221 0.221 0.219 0.219 0.218
k/h 12.861 12.872 12.861 13.015 12.861 12.99 12.861 13.064
y 0.281 0.278 0.279 0.278 0.277 0.276 0.275 0.275
sr 0.256 0.256 0.256 0.258 0.256 0.258 0.256 0.258
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Figure 1: An example where preferences are separable in consumption and
leisure.
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Figure 2: Decision rules for capital in the employment state (thin line) and in
the unemployment state (thick line) when the interest rate equals the rate of
time preference.
1
